Privy Council (Volume Six) — Preliminary Summary of the Battle in Shandong

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Author: Fang Congzhe, Exhausted in Mind and Heart
Discussed together with fellow readers: Scholar of Jinghu South Road, Brother IP, Gao Aocao, and others.

The Battle of Shandong, in summary, was a pyrrhic victory for Little Deng, yet for Chaghan, it cannot be considered a complete defeat either.

Why is that? Because their starting points and objectives differed. Little Deng began with scattered, weak forces, facing Chaghan’s eighty-thousand-strong elite army’s thunderous assault. To simply hold out was itself a victory.

Chaghan, on the other hand, launched with eighty thousand men against more than a hundred thousand of the Shandong Red Army (later reinforced by twenty or thirty thousand from Haidong). In terms of outcome, Tian Feng was crushed by him, and within two or three years, the three-pronged Red Army offensive against the capital city became nothing more than an illusion. Even their departure positions—Baoding, Zhending, and others—were retaken by Chaghan. Although he did not utterly destroy Little Deng or reclaim all of Shandong, he nonetheless wiped out a large portion of Deng’s troops, seized the key city of Jinan, and blocked any westward advance into Henan.

Chaghan’s main errors were twofold:
1. He underestimated the enemy’s strength, splitting his forces and fighting on multiple fronts, leading to prolonged battles with no decisive victory.
2. He failed in the encirclement and annihilation of the main enemy force at Jinan.
3. The siege of Tai’an was unsuccessful.

(Scholar of Jinghu South Road: I strongly agree with the first point—over-dividing the troops and overemphasizing strategy; it would have been better to concentrate forces and take Yidu quickly, ending the campaign much sooner.

Second, Wang Baobao, an exceptional figure at the end of the Yuan and the start of the Ming, was disappointing here. Despite overwhelming numerical superiority, he was stalled first at Jinan and then at Huashan. If there hadn’t been a betrayal within Jinan, whether the city would have fallen is questionable. To return to the topic of dividing forces: if Chaghan had simply contained Jinan and Tai’an with smaller detachments and thrown his main strength at Yidu, how different might the outcome have been?)

Little Deng’s main errors were:
1. Relying too much on fortified cities, resulting in isolated fighting on several fronts and the loss of both people and territory at various locations.
2. Being besieged in Yidu caused a loss of overall control, and several mobile detachments performed poorly, unlike Chaghan, who utilized every available man.

(Scholar of Jinghu South Road: I agree with the second point.

By rights, Little Deng should have had the advantage of terrain, being the local power, but unexpectedly suffered ambushes in several places, practically walking into traps. Fortunately, the commanders leading the various armies had considerable talent, and none suffered disastrous defeats. Had there been more meticulous planning from the outset, moving headquarters to the rear for overall command, the battle would have been much easier to fight.)

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As for the third point, the premature loss of Jinan was beyond control. However, Little Deng failed to make preventive preparations in advance or to establish clear contingencies, for which he must bear leadership responsibility.

On the first point, I also agree. When weak against strong, one should not fixate on the gain or loss of a single city or fortress, but rather exploit the army’s mobility to cut off the enemy’s supply lines, concentrate superior forces to destroy the enemy’s vital strength, and prepare for a protracted struggle.

It makes one marvel again at how brilliant Mao the Great Ancestor’s guerrilla tactics were.

Fang Congzhe, Exhausted in Mind and Heart: Originally, concentrating superior forces for a war of annihilation requires a willingness to make sacrifices, but Little Deng still lacks the conditions for this. Nor is there a strong foundation among the people to cooperate—for instance, if Deng were really to abandon Yidu, undoubtedly all of Shandong would have fallen to Chaghan.

*In history, it’s not always possible to let go either—for example, during the command of Shanye, there was difficulty letting go of Huai’an, leading to defeat in the defense of the two Huai campaigns. There were also times when it was impossible to let go—such as the defense of Siping; if Siping had been abandoned lightly, the Eastern Field Army might have been expelled from China entirely.*

But it’s not as easy as those few diehard nationalists in the book review section want to make it out to be. Especially certain people who only focus on the Northeastern front—come on, without the real “millet plus rifles” from the interior, could they have rested so long before the summer offensive? Don’t kid yourself. Even without “millet plus rifles” from the south of Liaoning, they could have regrouped in the Soviet Union. The battles in Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu, the northwest, and even Lvliang are invisible to these people.

Scholar of Jinghu South Road: Yes, I strongly recommend that Little Deng should work harder to foster relations with the army groups and promote the spirit of the people’s army. The support of the masses is the supply line, the guarantee of logistics.

Another suggestion: Little Deng should broaden his vision and mind. After all, someone from the 21st century who has crossed over should have at least some awareness of modern warfare; otherwise, this crossing is utterly wasted.

Fang Congzhe, Exhausted in Mind and Heart: Even with modern warfare awareness, it’s not easy.

Not being a soldier himself, just an ordinary university student, what military literacy could he possibly have? Rather than flaunting half-understood knowledge and ending up even worse than Zhao Kuo, it’s better to be honest and cautious.

Poor Pan Xian’er, having offered countless strategies, none adopted—or if taken up, turned into failures. If it were me, I’d defect to Chaghan.)

3. Jinan was lost too early.

As a consultant at the guesthouse, it is only natural, after this summary, to offer recommendations for future action:

1. In this campaign, our army suffered grievous losses. Yang Wanhu’s unit, once called the Fifth Yamen, has only two or three thousand men left and has lost combat effectiveness. Gao Yanshi and Li Zifan have only five hundred left between them, also losing combat effectiveness. Li Heshang and Bi Qianniu have just over ten thousand remaining, capable only of defending cities. Liu Gui’s unit was completely wiped out, ironically bolstering the enemy by several thousand. Tong Shengyang’s two thousand have slightly regained some fighting ability. Wen Xguo and Guo Conglong’s newly arrived forces still have combat capacity. Xu Jizu, Hu Zhong, Deng Chengzhi, Zhang Daier, and others total around ten thousand, but are all exhausted or unable to fight again.

Our total engaged forces were eighty to ninety thousand; this battle cost us nearly half, and we have lost the power to fight in the short term. The Liaodong front has no mobile troops to send in support. The garrison army, once several tens of thousands, has almost entirely dispersed or been killed or captured. The navy under Liu Yang has also lost several thousand.

Meanwhile, Chaghan’s forces lost only twenty to thirty thousand, and have replenished several thousand locally.

Although our unpreparedness and the abundance of newly organized units contributed, this also starkly revealed the vast tactical and leadership gap between our forces and Chaghan’s. Especially among our Shandong local troops—apart from Chen Routou, none were fit for battle; by contrast, the local troops Chaghan brought from Henan were nearly as capable as his main force. Even our Korean provincial troops, barring Zhang Daier from the north, did not compare to Chaghan’s. Therefore, training of local troops must be especially strengthened.

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2. Our civil and military coordination was effective and deserves praise; this experience should be summarized and codified into regulations to clarify the relationships among generals, local officials, and staff officers.

3. After this battle, our army has lost the ability to take the offensive and should recuperate. On the one hand, units need to be reorganized; on the other, agriculture should be promoted in Donglai.

However, Jinan and Jining are the lifelines of our army and must be retaken. Preparations should be made early to recover these places and extend our influence to Dongping and Dongchang. At the very least, plans for recapturing Jinan should be made in advance.

4. Tian Feng formerly shielded Hebei for our army. Although his conduct in this campaign was extremely unreliable, at the end of the operation he still managed to capture Hejian Prefecture, once again forming a protective barrier for us in Hebei.

Since our forces are currently incapable of advancing northwards toward the capital, some buffer is better than none. Tian Feng is easily replaced, but another like him may be hard to find!

(Scholar of Jinghu South Road: I disagree with the fourth point. Rather than relying on a fence-sitter like Tian Feng as a buffer, it would be better to replace him, push the front line forward, and assign a competent general to hold the position. With the same number of troops, anyone would outperform Tian Feng.

Fang Congzhe, Exhausted in Mind and Heart: Hejian Road cannot be held under full enemy assault; rather than waste forces and end up like Wang Shisan of Zichuan, it’s better to let Tian Feng have it.

Not taking Tian Feng also has value in terms of united front work. If you always act too ruthlessly, who will trust you in the future?

You killed Wang Shicheng and took his wife; though you promoted Gao Yanshi and treated Chen Routou well, it only reassures generals from other factions about their own prospects after being annexed. But for the rulers of other powers, I’m afraid...)

5. Drawing lessons from this campaign, a system of front and rear command headquarters should be established.

Take this battle as an example: our tenacious defense of Yidu had great political and strategic significance, and could not have been held without Deng She in person. Thus, Deng She’s refusal to withdraw was justified. However, Deng She did not appoint a second-in-command with comprehensive authority (only later did Wen Pingzhang become this), resulting in everyone relying on a commander trapped in Yidu, who was often out of contact and forced to command in isolation, leading to poor performance.

To avoid this in future, a system of front and rear headquarters should be established to ensure such issues do not arise again.

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Brother IP: Pan Xian’er’s strategy was, in my opinion, an excellent one. It’s a shame it was not adopted. Li Zifan, it seems, was overly cautious.

Gao Aocao: After this battle, most of the Yidu faction’s military commanders have been killed or wounded; Generals Gao and Chen have lost most of their troops, retaining at most thirty percent. Objectively, this has strengthened the control of the Haidong regime over Shandong.

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