The Privy Council (Volume Six) A Preliminary and Further Inquiry into the Battle of Shandong

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Author: Mu Mu Wu
Contributing readers: Bai Lang Beng Yun, mymachinegun, Infrastructure

Preliminary Analysis of the Battle of Shandong

Cha Han’s campaign against Shandong was executed rapidly, clearly a blitzkrieg tactic—defeating the Tian faction was a tangible achievement. Whether he could leverage this momentum to expand his victories depended on the strength of the Haidong Army. Judging by the Haidong Army’s capture of Shandong and their balanced stance against the Tian faction, as well as their performance in Liaodong, Cha Han resolved to press forward. Was this decision flawed? First, both sides’ intelligence was limited, preventing a thorough assessment. Second, the Haidong Army had not fully established itself; both forces were outsiders, but Cha Han’s army was already renowned as a powerful force, whereas the Haidong Army was merely a regional contender. Under these circumstances, if Cha Han had hesitated, seeking stability and advancing cautiously after reorganizing his troops, he would have been criticized for missing a golden opportunity. His strategy was hard to fault; when his siege of Jinan and Tai’an failed, he decisively redirected his troops toward Yidu, aiming to capture the leader before the followers.

Young Deng responded with remarkable skill. He dispatched two elite forces to support, leaving Yidu’s defenses somewhat thin—even risky—revealing his intent to stall for time.

What followed, as written by Zi Yue, was brilliantly executed. Both Cha Han and Young Deng played their hands well; with no major errors in strategy or tactics, the outcome ultimately depended on the fighting strength of their armies.

Some opinions from the reviews I personally disagree with.

1. Zi Yue claims: Young Deng reformed his army using propaganda techniques from later times. This influence has been exaggerated by politics. First, ancient times already had indoctrination of loyalty to the ruler and family, not inferior to the religious-style brainwashing of certain parties. Second, another reason will be explained below.

2. The claim that a certain party cared little for territory and focused on exterminating the enemy’s living forces is misleading. The explanation ties into the second point above. Specifically:

After the War of Resistance, the party seized a batch of weapons from the Japanese army, then secured victory in the Liaoshen Campaign. This victory was multifaceted. First, they gained a fully modernized base for industry, agriculture, and commerce, with the nation’s most advanced transportation network. Without such a stronghold, relying on the poverty-stricken Yan’an would never have supported a full-scale war. Second, judging by the composition of the party’s troops, fighting wasn’t based on the so-called brainwashing methods later promoted; the Nationalist Army’s reputation in the northeast was no worse than the party’s. In other words, the victory in the Liaoshen Campaign owed little to propaganda. Later, as other units gained more recruits from the central plains, most were destitute, easily manipulated, and since the party’s main corps had such a glorious record, other units had to fight hard. Given these differences, I don’t believe Young Deng’s adoption of later brainwashing methods had much effect. To be strict, Old Mao didn’t innovate much; he loved reading classical texts—whether in politics or military affairs, he simply learned from the ancients and added a dash of contemporary context. Young Deng’s copying of this seems somewhat laughable. Third, why didn’t the party seize territory? Because at the outset, they lacked sufficient manpower to hold it! As for destroying the enemy’s living forces, that was possible because of the party’s Fourth Field Army, well-armed. Millet and rifles were mere cannon fodder, used to block roads; in decisive confrontations, artillery mattered most. Without these premises, saying the party focused on eliminating living forces is biased. When someone says Zhao Guo’s reinforcements must be wiped out, you must first block their retreat. Moreover, in cold weapon combat, it’s hard to break a commander like Zhao Guo, who is determined to defend; otherwise, Zhuge Liang wouldn’t have coughed up blood. Of course, if the garrison commander is mediocre, or the attacker is willing to sacrifice endless cannon fodder, that’s another matter.

Additionally, I suggest Zi Yue stop plagiarizing poetry and such. Humans are forgetful and highly adaptable. Not only in time-travel scenarios, but even moving to another region or country breaks ties; in time travel, the connection is fully severed. Only authors straddling both modern and ancient worlds would consider transplanting modern things. Besides, modern China is extremely westernized, with severe cultural and intellectual discontinuities, leaving no soil for transplantation; most things simply cannot stand.

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Bai Lang Beng Yun: I basically agree.

However, one point: reputation is not the same as brainwashing. A good reputation means public support, but the contribution of Liaoshen locals was less than in Huaihai. The party’s key was to indoctrinate soldiers to fight desperately, fearlessly, and foster strong unity among commanders. The party could maintain discipline, even modifying the leader’s orders. The Nationalist Army lacked unity; Bai Chongxi once cornered the party, but Old Jiang meddled. On the battlefield, frequent changes in command and cross-level orders undermined cohesion; the Nationalist Army’s fighting spirit paled compared to the party’s indoctrination—look at the Battle of Tashan.

The Nationalist Army’s best-performing units were university student battalions, possibly in Shenyang, who exhausted their ammunition but refused to surrender. Their education shielded them from Marxist manipulation, causing the party considerable trouble.

Mu Mu Wu: After victory in the War of Resistance, the party reversed its fortunes and occupied the entire country in just four years—a miracle in world history. The first turning point was the northeast. What was the main reason? The “fearless” explanation doesn’t hold; bandits have always been so, but rarely succeed. I suspect it might be the Soviet Union...

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Bai Lang Beng Yun: I wasn’t just talking about fearlessness. Look at the fate of Xiao Zhuge from outside factions—tragic! Look at the party’s reckless cross-level commands, and the Nationalist Army’s internal strife.

Besides, thousands who don’t fear death represent quantitative change (bandits); tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands mark a qualitative change (the party, haha). Tashan was beyond any bandit’s capability; without Tashan, the campaign would have been rewritten. The victory was razor-thin.

At that time, the Soviet Union dared not confront America, which already occupied Japan. Even with Korea under its nose, the Soviets were ready to abandon it, and their first test proposal was easily approved by the polar bear. Otherwise, what business would Syngman Rhee have? Stalin even wanted to befriend the party, abandoning Old Mao. The party pleaded endlessly before accepting the Soviet occupation zone, even fiercely criticizing the Russians. In the Korean War, the Soviets only provided World War I rifles, and even with a falling out with America, they never vigorously aided China. The Nationalist Army never considered the Soviets a main factor.

Sometimes, fortune favors the bold. Yan’an sent Liaoshen’s main generals to the northeast on a single shabby plane, so daring it made witnesses tremble. If Bo Gu or Ye Ting had encountered trouble, the party might have lost the country.

Mu Mu Wu: Cross-level commands and factionalism existed within the party as well.

Tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands who don’t fear death—that’s mostly a result of later indoctrination. Mainly, the party’s leaders were more bandit-like, willing to gamble at key moments. During the battle for Jinzhou, when outnumbered, the party hesitated—first, it was their own loyal troops, hard to sacrifice; second, their academy backgrounds made them prone to this; third, perhaps personality played a role (otherwise, why later flee instead of risking all like Li Shimin?). Ultimately, the higher-ups forced them to send in cannon fodder.

This urgency and opportunism eventually defined the party. Though bandits rarely succeed, those who do are often bandits. Old Jiang was a bandit by birth, with impeccable pedigree—unfortunately, he faced Old Mao’s gang of outlaws. As the saying goes, a bandit fears nothing but another bandit—the nemesis.

mymachinegun: I disagree with “the Nationalist Army’s reputation in the northeast was no worse than the party’s”! Do you know what “forcible collection” means? After the War of Resistance, Kuomintang officials plundered the occupied regions, indulging in the “five sons’ success”—houses, cars, positions, money, and women, leaving nothing behind and robbing the populace of confidence. People said: “Longing for the central government, hoping for it, but when it arrives, things get worse!” Sometimes, multiple officials seized the same factory—one took the machinery, another the building, a third the raw materials—so production halted! Worse than under Japanese occupation. The locals, stripped by the Japanese, were then plundered again by Kuomintang officials, living on the brink of survival. When the party entered the northeast, they restored production and order. Comparing the two, the party’s reputation in the northeast far surpassed the Kuomintang’s. In 1948, land reform began: rent and interest reductions ended, and land was directly allotted to peasants. The land that farmers had dreamed of for centuries was finally theirs; naturally, they wanted to defend their property. Everyone knew the “returning corps” couldn’t come back, or there’d be more suffering! They actively supported the party’s military efforts. Simultaneously, they encouraged captured Kuomintang soldiers: “Your family has received land! Fight your way home to claim it!” Commanders led from the front, enduring hardship before pleasure—this is what you call “brainwashing.” People weren’t fools; the party gave tangible benefits, so they followed. With logistics and troops secured, plus the party’s command, victory was inevitable.

Since ancient times, rebels have had a key advantage over rulers: they can confiscate the wealth of the small, privileged elite and redistribute it to the masses, thus gaining support and reversing the power imbalance with the state apparatus.

Infrastructure: When the polar bear left, it handed all Japanese arsenals to the party. That’s why the party’s army was so strong—the ammunition consumed in training before the war was enough to fight another Liaoshen campaign. And during the Korean War, the MiG Alley was opened, so how could they have only World War I rifles?

Bai Lang Beng Yun: Giving Japanese weapons to comrades was expected. Soviet tanks had crushed the party’s forces many times; they didn’t care for Japanese mountain artillery. At the time, the world’s strongest land army wouldn’t value Japan’s Murata rifles or mountain guns. To fight America, shou